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ABSTRACT: 
 
This article examines one of the major foreign policy disasters of recent times: 
the American invasion of Iraq in 2003. It explores American policy in terms of the 
utopian attempt to create a perfect society in Iraq based on the American model. It 
will locate origins for American policy in Thomas More’s text and argue that, 500 years 
after the original publication, utopianism plays a vital role in global politics. American 
neoconservatism originates in two waves of reaction against the authoritarian 
utopianism of the revolutionary left, the first one in the 1930s and the second one –
that founded neoconservatism proper – in the 1960s. Turning to standard American 
imagery, the neoconservatives concluded that moral renewal was the only way to 
return to the utopian vision of America’s founding fathers. It was thought that moral 
renewal within the USA could be encouraged by a strong foreign policy. The paper 
concludes is that utopias cannot be established through external force. 
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UTOPISMO Y GUERRA JUSTA: LA INVASIÓN DE IRAK EN 2003 
 
 
RESUMEN 
 
Este artículo examina uno de los principales desastres de política exterior de 
los últimos tiempos: la invasión estadounidense de Irak en 2003. Explora la política 
estadounidense en términos del intento utópico de crear una sociedad perfecta en Iraq, 
basada en el modelo estadounidense. Localiza los orígenes de la política americana en 
el texto de Tomás Moro y argumenta que, 500 años después de la publicación original, 
el utopismo juega un papel vital en la política global. El neoconservadurismo 
estadounidense se origina en dos oleadas de reacción contra el utopismo autoritario de 
la izquierda revolucionaria: el primero en la década de 1930 y el segundo –que fundó 
el neoconservadurismo propiamente dicho– en los años sesenta. Pasando a la 
imaginación colectiva norteamericana, concluyeron que la renovación moral era la 
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única forma de regresar a la visión utópica de los padres fundadores de los Estados 
Unidos. Se pensó que la renovación moral dentro de los EE. UU. podría ser alentada 
por una política exterior fuerte. La conclusión es que las utopías no se pueden 
establecer a través de la fuerza externa. 
 
PALABRAS CLAVE: Guerra de Irak, Neoconservadurismo, Utopía, Política exterior 
Americana, Neoliberalismo 
 
*** 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Herbert Marcuse famously wrote that «Utopia... refers to projects for change 
that are considered impossible»1. Yet the history of utopianism is packed with attempts 
to create precisely what Marcuse considered impossible. One such attempt was the 
American invasion of Iraq in 2003 which can be interpreted as a utopian project 
intended to create a perfect society in Iraq, rationalised by claims of just war as 
originally formulated by Thomas More2. As More claimed, although the Utopians 
«detest war as a very brutal thing», they believe it can serve ethical purposes3.  
 
The Utopian theory of just war holds that, even though war is inherently 
undesirable, it is permitted in cases of aggression by another power, oppression by a 
country of its own citizens or interference with the business interests of another, but 
only if diplomatic solutions are first tried and then fail. In line with More’s account of 
utopian theory, American policy was presented as a virtuous enterprise designed to 
save Iraqis from the tyranny of Saddam Hussein and protect the West from Saddam’s 
supposed weapons of mass destruction. Added to the rationalisation of the invasion 
as a just war, Washington’s policy was influenced by a millennial belief that the global 
triumph of American culture was inevitable. In the eyes of American protagonists for 
the war, the successful creation of an American-style utopia in Iraq as a prelude to the 
global utopia was therefore preordained. The Americans’ millennial utopian agenda 
was itself based in a combination of two prevalent ideologies, neoliberalism and 
neoconservativism. The whole account of the invasion and its aftermath then becomes 
an analysis of the problems (or impossibility, as Marcuse would say) of imposing utopia 
by force. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
1 Herbert Marcuse, Five Lectures: Psychoanalysis, Politics and Utopia (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970), 
63. 
2 Nicholas Campion, The New Age in the Modern West: Counter-Culture, Utopia and Prophecy from the late 
Eighteenth Century to the Present Day (London: Bloomsbury 2015), 149-60. 
3 Thomas More, Utopia (London and New York: Verso, 2016), 228. 
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THE INVASION OF IRAQ 
 
At the time of writing we are now entering the fourteenth year of the civil war 
in Iraq. It is reasonable to suggest that the invasion was one of the biggest foreign 
policy disasters of modern times, equivalent to American involvement in Vietnam in 
the 1960s or the Soviet war in Afghanistan in the 1980s. The question is why the 
aftermath of the invasion of Iraq was so chaotic. One obvious reason could be simple 
incompetence. As Christopher Meyer, former UK ambassador to Washington wrote, 
«The failure to plan meticulously for Saddam’s aftermath led to almost a decade of 
violent chaos and the ultimate humiliation of British forces»4. The initial failure to plan 
on a large scale resulted in a secondary failure to anticipate a range of possible 
consequences of the invasion. This is now well understood. For example, Michael 
Codner, formerly Director of the Military Sciences Department at the Royal United 
Services Institute, concluded that «British planning did not take into account the range 
of likely outcomes following invasion and regime change» 5 . However, when we 
examine the reasons for failure, incompetence can be interpreted as the result of a 
wider ideological perspective. 
 
 
THE REASONS FOR THE INVASION 
 
A simple reason for the invasion, popular amongst its critics, was the American 
desire to control Iraqi oil6. However, it was the need to replace Saddam Hussein and 
remove the supposed weapons of mass destruction were presented as the key reasons 
for the invasion: both arguments conformed to More’s notion of a just war (to oppose 
tyranny and prevent aggression) and were set out by Colin Powell in the presentation 
at which he sought support from United Nations7. Yet, the desire to control Iraqi oil 
was openly admitted by leading American policy makers. Christopher Meyer’s own 
testimony provides anecdotal evidence. Recalling a meeting with Paul Wolfowitz, 
Deputy Secretary of Defense, Meyer wrote, 
 
I remember a meeting with an old friend, Paul Wolfowitz, a leading neo-con 
thinker on foreign affairs. Paul waxed fervently to me about the need to 
                                                        
4 Christopher Meyer, “Iraq War: Sir Christopher Meyer: 'I'm with you whatever', Tony Blair told 
George Bush”, The Daily Telegraph, 9 March, 2013, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/9919816/Iraq-War-Sir-
Christopher-Meyer-Im-with-you-whatever-Tony-Blair-told-George-Bush.html [accessed 14 March, 
2017]. 
5 Michael Codner, ‘The Two Towers, 2001-13’, in Wars in Peace: British Military Operations since 1991, 
ed. Adrian L. Johnson (London: Royal United Services Institute, 2014), 61-2.  
6  Nafeez Ahmed, ‘Iraq invasion was about oil’, The Guardian, 20 March, 2014, 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/earth-insight/2014/mar/20/iraq-war-oil-resources-
energy-peak-scarcity-economy [accessed 11 March, 2017]. 
7 “Full text of Colin Powell's speech: US secretary of state's address to the United Nations security 
council,”, The Guardian, 5 February, 2003, accessed 14 March, 
2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/feb/05/iraq.usa [accessed 14 March 2017]. 
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extend democracy to the Middle East, create in Iraq an alternative to Saudi 
Arabia as an oil-producing ally of the US, and occupy forthwith the southern 
Iraqi oil fields, from where to undermine Saddam8. 
 
Back in 1992 the New York Times had published leaked documents detailing 
American priorities in the Middle East, documenting the need to provide long-term 
military guarantees following the first gulf war9. 
 
Oil security and profit therefore generated geopolitical concerns which, in turn, 
required a huge military presence in the area, and the creation of what John Kampfner 
called «a ring of American bases», which would enable «the US writ... to run 
everywhere»10. However, if we wish to understand why the invasion was such a failure, 
we need to contextualise the wider psychology of the American administration in 2003, 
and consider whether the USA’s rationale for the invasion in terms of just war, was 
genuine, or just a front for a war of profit and aggression? The key occurs in Meyer’s 
memory of Wolfowitz’s desire to expand democracy to the Middle East, testimony to 
the sincerity of key American foreign policy makers: Wolfowitz’s enthusiasm for 
democracy was not for public consumption but the result of deeply held beliefs. 
America could quite easily continue to buy oil from dictatorships, such as its close ally, 
Saudi Arabia, as it had for many years. It could also have worked to find a suitable 
modus operandi with Saddam Hussein, restoring the pragmatic alliance against Iran of 
the early1980s 11 . There was no pressing commercial need to avoid dealing with 
dictatorships including with Saddam.  
 
 
NEOCONSERVATISM AND NEOLIBERALISM 
 
The twin ideologies which dominated the policy of the Bush White House in 
the early 2000s were neoliberalism and neoconservatism. Fundamentally, neoliberalism 
requires the freedom to trade as far as possible without regulation, the state’s role being 
limited to such essential roles as guaranteeing the value of money. Neoliberalism, the 
theory runs, is the most effective way to enhance human well-being12. In utopian terms, 
unregulated free trade is therefore the best guarantor of the future paradise. When 
Adam Smith wrote the original manifesto of what came to be neoliberal economics, 
he made it clear that free trade is not just one policy option, but part of the natural 
order of the world. 
 
                                                        
8 Meyer, ‘Iraq War’. 
9 “Department of Defense release of the February 18, 1992 draft Defense Planning Guidance”, New 
York Times, 8 March, 1992, 
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb245/doc03_extract_nytedit.pdf [accessed 11 March 2017]. 
10 John Kampfner, Blair’s Wars (London: The Free Press, 2004), 25. 
11 Seymour M. Hersh, “U.S. Secretly Gave Aid to Iraq Early in Its War Against Iran,” New York 
Times, 26 January, 1992, http://www.nytimes.com/1992/01/26/world/us-secretly-gave-aid-to-iraq-
early-in-its-war-against-iran.html?pagewanted=all [accessed 11 March, 2017]. 
12 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 3. 
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The uniform, constant, and uninterrupted effort of every man to better his 
condition, the principle from which public and national, as well as private 
opulence is originally derived, is frequently powerful enough to maintain the 
natural progress of things towards improvement, in spite both of the 
extravagance of government and the greatest errors of administration13. 
 
By the 1980s neoliberalism had become a state-sanctioned utopian policy, first 
in the UK and USA, then spreading to first to other western countries and becoming 
a global movement. As Steven Lukes wrote, the 1980s saw the rise of 
 
a new proactive and utopian “neo-liberal” right whose increasingly 
hegemonic ideology gripped the world in the latter part of the century with 
the ascendancy of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher14. 
 
Neoliberalism adopted certain standard right wing principles, such as 
patriotism and a devotion to law and order, but was distinguished from mainstream 
conservatism in the late 20th century by its transformation into a radical movement, 
challenging economic regulation and turning free markets rather than the state into a 
mechanism for social improvement 15 .In absolute terms neoliberalism and 
neoconservatism are fundamentally incompatible. However, they formed an alliance 
in the White House under George W. Bush, as well as in the policy imperatives of 
Margaret Thatcher, Ronald Reagan and Tony Blair, in order to reinforce the utopian 
drift of politics in the 1990s. 
 
Neoconservatism has fundamentally different priorities to neoliberalism. As a 
utopian ideology, it requires the revival of the lost certainties of civil and social virtue, 
together with the regulation of public behaviour as a means of restoring the perfect 
society. It is essentially backwards looking, imagining a return to a lost golden age, 
unlike the future-oriented concerns of neoliberalism. American neoconservatism 
originated in two waves of reaction against the authoritarian utopianism of the 
revolutionary left16. The first wave took place in the 1930s, when a small number of 
intellectual Marxists became disillusioned with Stalinism. The second wave, and the 
founding of neoconservatism proper, took place in the 1960s when a group of liberal 
and left-wing intellectuals were horrified by the violent behaviour of many student 
protestors. Turning to standard American imagery, such as the Shining City on the Hill, 
or the New Jerusalem, such disillusioned Marxists concluded that moral renewal was 
the only way to return to the utopian vision of America’s founding fathers.  
 
                                                        
13 Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (no place: Shine Classics, 2014), 187. 
14 Steven Lukes, “The grand dichotomy of the twentieth century,” in The Cambridge History of Twentieth 
Century Political Thought, ed. Terence Ball and Richard Bellamy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003), 623. https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521563543.030 
15 Patricia Ventura, Neoliberal Culture: Living with American Liberalism (Farnham: Ashgate 2012). 
16 Campion, The New Age in the Modern West, 150-1. 
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Discussion of utopianism was itself a feature of the rejection of revolutionary 
Marxism. The classic text of the 1930s proto-neoconservatives was Eugene Lyons’ 
memoire Assignment in Utopia, utopia here being used ironically to refer to the Soviet 
Union17 . And in one of the foundational texts of post-war neoconservatism, the 
sociologist Daniel Bell announced that the end of the ideological struggle between Left 
and Right, which he thought had arrived with the discrediting of the Left, need not 
include the loss of utopian hopes:  
 
The end of ideology is not – should not be the end of utopia as well. If 
anything, one can begin anew the discussion of utopia only by being aware of 
the trap of ideology...There is now, more than ever, some need for utopia, in 
the sense that men need – as they have always needed – some vision of the 
potential, some manner of using passion with intelligence. Yet the ladder to 
the City of Heaven can no longer be a “faith ladder”, but an empirical one18. 
 
Neoconservatism’s prime focus was not on economics but on the perceived 
collapse of social values, and Bell believed that, in order to be successful, utopian policy 
should in future be based less on Biblical imagery, than on detailed sociological data. 
However, the fact of moral decay was taken as a given. As Gertrude Himmelfarb wrote, 
«civil society has been infected by the same virus that has contaminated the entire 
culture: irresponsibility, incivility, a lack of self-discipline and self-control» 19 . 
Neoconservatism’s core concern was the need to reverse moral decay at home, and 
foreign policy was secondary, if still important. For example, Bell thought that a 
symptom of moral collapse amongst anti-war protesters in the 1960s was their 
acceptance of communism, as evident in the popular iconography of Mao Tse-tung 
and Ho Chi-Minh. This in turn was thought to have resulted in a weakening of anti-
communism as the key plank of American foreign policy, as evident in détente. 
Neoconservative theory held that such moral renewal could be encouraged by a strong 
foreign policy, as described by Peter Steinfels: 
 
A precarious international order requires a stable, unified society at home; 
renewed emphasis on the Communist threat and on the Third World’s 
rejection of liberal values is needed to generate the requisite national 
allegiance and discipline20. 
 
Neoconservative foreign policy, then, was initially essentially negative, 
requiring an enemy abroad in order to encourage moral renewal at home. 
 
 
                                                        
17 Eugene Lyons, Assignment in Utopia (London: George C. Harrap, 1938). 
18 Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties (New York: The Free 
Press, 1962), 405. 
19 Gertrude Himmelfarb. ‘This Will Hurt’. In This Will Hurt: The Restoration of Virtue and Civic Order, 
The Social Affairs Unit, Digby Anderson (ed.), 1995, x. 
20 Peter Steinfel. The Neoconservatives: The Origins of a Movement (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2014), 
71. 
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FRANCIS FUKUYAMA AND NEOCONSERVATIVE FOREIGN POLICY 
 
Neoconservative foreign policy took on a new lease of life in 1989 as a result 
of the disintegration of the communist regimes of Eastern Europe. Enthused by that 
year’s wave of popular revolutions, the foreign policy analyst Francis Fukuyama 
announced that the end of ideological struggle proclaimed by Daniel Bell in 1962 had 
finally arrived with the triumph of American-style liberal democracy and free-market 
economics21. Fukuyama shared the neoconservatives’ pessimism over the condition of 
the west, writing that «We in the West have become thoroughly pessimistic with regard 
to the possibility of overall progress in democratic institutions»22. But then, he added, 
«good news has come», the cause for optimism being the progressive collapse of all 
the world’s dictatorships under the weight of their own inadequacies, spreading the 
example of eastern Europe to other regions, such as the Middle East23. This is what 
Fukuyama meant by the end of history. The “last man” of his title was actually to be 
the product not just of the triumph of American culture but of the scientific 
manipulation of humanity, achieving what decades of social engineering had failed to 
accomplish: «we shall then» he wrote, «finally have definitely finished human history, 
because we shall have abolished human beings as such. And then a new, post-human 
history will begin»24. Fukuyama did not appeal to utopia as his model, but his theories 
were deeply utopian in their anticipation of future perfection.  
 
Fukuyama’s most significant philosophical influence was Georg Frederick 
Hegel, arguably the most important of the Enlightenment Platonists. In Hegel’s 
millennial vision history is driven by the gradual unfolding of the Platonic world soul 
originally imagined in Timaeus25. He believed that in the final, inevitable, perfected state 
of existence, all cause of conflict would be resolved, hence Fukuyama’s belief in the 
end of history. Hegelianism, the ideology derived from Hegel, often adopts a 
deterministic view of a goal-oriented history which is bound to arrive at a final 
destination. Hegel himself was somewhat more equivocal, for while there is an end 
and a purpose, its precise form is unknown26. The final state may be Germany, or it 
may be the United States, but this is for individual Hegelians to decide and doesn’t 
matter as long as it is the advanced, industrial regions of the white, Protestant, Anglo-
Saxon world. Either way, the Hegelian utopia lies in the end of history.  
 
                                                        
21 Frances Fukuyama, 'The End of History?', The National Interest, no 16, Summer 1989, 3-18; Frances 
Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, London: Penguin, 1991. 
22 Fukuyama, The End of History, xiii. 
23 Fukuyama, The End of History, xiii. 
24 Fukuyama, ‘The end of history?’, 4. 
25 Plato, Timaeus, trans. R.G. Bury (Cambridge Mass., London: Harvard University Press 1931), 41D; 
G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, trans. J. Sibree (New York: Dover Publications, 1956), 442. 
26 Eric Dale, Hegel, the End of History and the Future (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 
3. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107477711 
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The driver of Fukuyama’s millenarian narrative was psychological and 
humanist – the supposed need of the thymos, part of the Platonic soul, for recognition 
and self-esteem. 27  It was this need, Fukuyama argued, which had provoked the 
oppressed citizens of the communist world to rebel. Fukuyama’s claim that the end of 
communism and the triumph of the USA were both written into both the psychic 
fabric of humanity and the inexorable direction of history was enthusiastically adopted 
by the neoconservatives, for whom it demonstrated the inevitable triumph of their 
cause. The result was the foundation in 1997 of the think-tank, “The Project for the 
New American Century”. Fukuyama himself was one of the original 25 signaturees, 
and the Chairman was the leading neoconservative, William Kristol. According to its 
own vision statement, the Project was, 
 
dedicated to a few fundamental propositions: that American leadership is 
good both for America and for the world; and that such leadership requires 
military strength, diplomatic energy and commitment to moral principle (and 
was intended to) strive to rally support for a vigorous and principled policy 
of American international involvement...28 
 
The neoconservatives’ initial negative policy, which required only the presence 
of an enemy, was transformed into a positive policy in which the enemy should be 
attacked and overthrown. From the outset the Project campaigned actively for an 
invasion of Iraq. For example, a memorandum of 7 January 1999, twenty months 
before the 9/11 attacks on the New York Twin Towers, argued that «Now that the 
dust has settled from the 70-hour aerial attack on Iraq, it has become clear that the 
only solution for the threat Iraq poses is to remove Saddam»29. John Kampfner recalled 
that 
 
Prior to the invasion, the neoconservatives’ optimism had known no bounds: 
“After Baghdad, Beijing” ran one boast. They saw especially in the Middle 
East a web of corrupt dictators, whose people would, if given the chance, 
embrace a Jeffersonian view of democracy. Iraq was top of the list30. 
 
The neoconservatives’ Jeffersonian optimism was justified by Fukuyama’s 
prophecy of the inevitability of the triumph of American values; any invasion of Iraq 
was therefore bound to be successful precisely because of this inevitability. It was this 
belief that accounts for the failure to plan, and even what appears to be incompetence 
can be interpreted as a result of the belief that no planning was necessary, for success 
                                                        
27 Fukuyama, The End of History, 163; also see 223-34, 300-12. 
28  The Project for the New American Century, archived copy from 9 June, 2013, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20130609154959/http://www.newamericancentury.org/ [accessed 24 
July, 2014]. 
29 Mark Lagon, “Memorandum to Opinion Leaders”, The Project for the New American Century, 
January 7, 1999 
https://web.archive.org/web/20130609165624/http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraqjan0799.ht
m [accessed 24 July, 2014]. 
30 Kampfner, Blair’s Wars, 25. 
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was assured. It was Fukuyama himself who later denounced this position on the 
grounds that the historical process had to be allowed to take its own course31. He 
argued that to promote regime change and actively seek to depose Saddam was 
therefore contrary to the law of history. However, after 9/11 the US administration 
revised its foreign policy. The new priorities were outlined by George W. Bush in 
November 2003, after the invasion of Iraq, in the first of a series of speeches. He 
announced a new “forward strategy” intended to promote democracy in the Middle 
East as the only sure guarantor of peace32. The policy consisted of three pillars. One 
was military dominance, in line with the 1992 defence review. The other two were pre-
emption and regime change, both of which represented radical breaks with previous 
American policy in the Middle East, and assumed that the pace of history could be 
forced.  
 
Can the pace of history be forced? Fukuyama thought not, but the Project for 
the New American Century thought it could. The question is an established one in 
millennial thought and had been the essence of Lenin’s argument in 1902, when he 
attacked social democrats for being diverted into reformism and instead argued for the 
creation of a revolutionary vanguard in order to promote revolution, rather than wait 
for it to take place in its own time33. In 1917 Lenin was distinguished from many of 
his fellows by his belief that Russia, which was hardly ready for a transition to the 
dictatorship of the proletariat, might still be pushed into revolution. The guiding 
ideology behind neoconservative foreign policy may then be described as what the 
political scientist Ken Jowitt called “Marx-Fukuyama”34. Jowitt argued simply, if that 
if the notion of forced historical change is then Leninist, then the notion of forced 
regime change as formulated by the neoconservatives becomes Leninist. 
 
 
IMPLEMENTING UNIVERSAL HISTORY IN IRAQ 
 
The argument that failure in Iraq was the consequence of blind optimism and 
a complete lack of attention to local conditions is found in Fukuyama’s own 
repudiation of the neoconservatives35. There were two main strands in the American 
reform programme in Iraq, one economic and the other political, both of which 
ignored local conditions. They were implemented together by Paul Bremer, head of 
the Coalition Provisional Authority, who disbanded the organs of Saddam’s rule, the 
Baath Party and the army, and instituted a policy of neo-liberal privatisation. What 
                                                        
31 Francis Fukuyama, After the Neocons: America at the Crossroads (London: Profile Books, 2007). 
32  ‘Bush demands Mid-East democracy’, BBC News 6 November 2003, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3248119.stm [accessed 25 April 2015]. 
33 Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, “What is to be Done?”, in Essential Works of Lenin (no place: bn publishing 
2015), 137. 
34 Kenneth Jowitt, New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1992), 88; Kenneth Jowitt, ‘Rage, Hubris and Regime Change: The Urge to Speed History Along’. Policy 
Review 118 (April-May 2003): 34-8. http://www.hoover.org/research/rage-hubris-and-regime-change 
[accessed 1 October 2014]. 
35 Fukuyama, After the Neocons, 95. 
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Bremer called «the switch from value-destroying public enterprises to value-creating 
private ones», would then, he hoped, provide a foundation for a free, democratic 
system.36 As Christopher Meyer later wrote, «we were, in effect, telling the Iraqi people 
to please start the business of nation-building all over again…»37. This was all done 
with absolutely no reference to existing conditions in the Iraqi economy. Quite the 
reverse, the belief was not only would the whole world become American, but that it 
wanted to be American. Thomas Friedman, a huge fan of Fukuyama had written that 
«Culturally speaking globalization has tended to involve the spread of Americanization 
– from Big Macs to iMacs to Micky Mouse»38. Neither was there any attention to local 
political conditions. One example has been described by Rory Stewart who served as 
part of the British administration in southern Iraq. Stewart recalled how  
 
An American expert came from Baghdad to do ‘capacity building’ with the 
local council. On a white board he drew an oblong in its side, to represent the 
council, and then beneath it four vertical oblongs, to represent its sub-
committees. ‘He is drawing a dog’, said a sheikh. ‘Are we going back to 
primary school?’ asked another. We are an ancient civilisation,’ said one cleric, 
‘and they treat us like Congo cannibals.39 
 
Such behaviour may sound like simple stupidity - a complete failure to 
comprehend the need to engage with Iraqi culture. But then it becomes clear that for 
the visiting expert, democracy is a universal condition, absolutely the same in all 
circumstances regardless of history or culture: «Welcome to your new democracy, said 
the democracy expert. I have met you before. I have met you in Cambodia I have met 
you in Russia. I have met you in Nigeria»40. 
 
Two members of the council promptly walked out. The assumption, in 
Timothy Mitchells’ words, was that «For an expert on democracy, democratic politics 
is the same everywhere… Democracy is based on a model, an original idea, that can 
be copied from one place to the next»41. It was, in effect, a Platonic archetype, eternal, 
universal and applicable equally in all places at all times. Reality was equally ignored by 
British policy makers. Here is Christopher Meyer again, this time on Tony Blair. 
 
With his Manichean, black-and-white view of the world, Mr Blair was in his 
way more neo-con than the neo-cons, more evangelical than the American 
Christian Right. From this flowed Britain’s contribution to the mistakes made 
                                                        
36  L. Paul Bremer III, “Operation Iraqi Prosperity”, Wall Street Journal, 20 June, 2003, 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB105606663932885100 [accessed 14 October, 2014]; see also 
Fukuyama, After the Neocons, 8 and Harvey, Neoliberalism, 4-5. 
37 Christopher Meyer, “Our national interest demands the mother of all U-turns.” The Daily Telegraph, 
23 August, 2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/11051734/Our-
national-interest-demands-the-mother-of-all-U-turns.html [accessed 15 March, 2017]. 
38 Thomas Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1999), 9.  
39 Rory Stewart, Occupational Hazards: My Time Governing in Iraq (London: Picador, 2006), p. 280; also 
see Timothy Mitchell, Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil (London: Verso, 2011), 2. 
40 Stewart, Occupational Hazards, 281. 
41 Mitchell, Carbon Democracy, 5. 
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before and after the Iraq invasion, despite repeated warnings from the 
Foreign Office and the Washington embassy42. 
 
For the neoconservatives, to lead the world to freedom was a bold dream but 
in the idea that history could be reset, it was reminiscent of the Jacobins’ revolutionary 
calendar or the Khmer Rouge’s Year Zero, in the idea that history could be reset. As 
Jowitt wrote, the belief that American-style democracy could be established in Iraq and 
the Middle East possessed ‘all the unreality of Don Quixote’. 43 It only existed in the 
realms of utopian impossibility. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The invasion of Iraq was launched as a just war within the definition outlined 
by Thomas More –to overthrow tyranny and resist aggression– and was intended to 
promote utopian ideals. The assumption that America has the finest system political 
and economic system in the world, together with the millennial belief that the entire 
world is bound by the law of history to become American, underpinned what was 
essentially an attempt to build utopia in Iraq. The reason for the lack of planning in 
Iraq was that for neoconservatives no planning was necessary; the metaphysics of 
history dictated that once Saddam Hussein had been overthrown, Iraq must of 
necessity become a neoliberal free market and an American style democracy as 
envisaged by the neoconservatives. From a domestic point of view, Iraq also then 
became a useful enemy. The invasion’s goals failed because the utopian ideal was 
confused with the idea of a directional history in which the end-goal was inevitable 
and the belief that the pace of this directional history could be forced. Daniel Bell’s 
assertion that utopia should be built on the basis of empirical data rather than faith 
was ignored and the result has been not utopia but dystopia. There is no clearer 
evidence that utopias cannot be established through external force. 
 
 
** 
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